Market-Based CEO Compensation and Ambiguous Signal in Asset Market
KCI
- Title
- Market-Based CEO Compensation and Ambiguous Signal in Asset Market
- Authors
- 한광석; 권준엽
- Date Issued
- 2022-12
- Publisher
- 한국금융공학회
- Abstract
- We develop a market-based CEO compensation contract model, in which the informed trader in the asset market receives noisy private signal with ambiguity. In the equilibrium compensation contract, inside owners does not refer to the firm’s liquidation value when monitoring the performance of the manager once the asset price is incorporated in the contract. We analyze the effects of ambiguity in the asset market on the manager’s effort level and the compensation contract. In the presence of ambiguity, the manager takes more efforts and the inside owner provides a higher weight on the asset price in the contract.
- URI
- https://oasis.postech.ac.kr/handle/2014.oak/116891
- ISSN
- 1738-124X
- Article Type
- Article
- Citation
- 金融工學硏究, vol. 21, no. 4, page. 193 - 213, 2022-12
- Files in This Item:
- There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.