DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | HAHN, GUANGSUG | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kwon, JY | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-03-07T01:12:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-03-07T01:12:33Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2019-02-25 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018-09 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1229-2893 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://oasis.postech.ac.kr/handle/2014.oak/94955 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study considers firms’ coarse information about a worker’s possible types in Spence’s (1973) job market signaling model. Using incentive compatibility constraints appropriate to coarse information, we derive perfect Bayesian equilibria, which are refined into a unique equilibrium by invoking an extension of Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion. In the unique refined equilibrium, a high-type worker may acquire a higher education level with a lower wage than in Spence’s (1973) model. This implies that education signaling may be less effective signal when firms have coarse information about a worker’s possible types compared to that in Spence (1973). © 2018, Korean Econometric Society. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | Korean Economic Society | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.title | Coarse Information Leads to Less Effective Signaling | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.22812/jetem.2018.29.3.003 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.29, no.3, pp.58 - 73 | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART002389128 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 73 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 58 | - |
dc.citation.title | Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics | - |
dc.citation.volume | 29 | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | HAHN, GUANGSUG | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85059129969 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.type.docType | ARTICLE | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Coarse information | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Extended intuitive criterion | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Job market signaling | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Perfect bayesian equilibrium | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
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